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The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) is one of the principal 
treaties of the World Trade Organization (WTO). The agreement covers twelve 
services sectors, including education (WTO 2000). Since this agreement was created, 
the global governance of education scenario has become more complex because a set 
of trade disciplines and commercial rules have become relevant to education 
regulation activities at the national and sub-national level. 
The system of rules of the GATS pushes for the progressive liberalization of 
education all over the world and for the constitution of a new international regime on 
trade in education. However, if we observe the actual results of the GATS 
negotiations, it doesn’t seem that the ‘globalization project’ impelled by the 
agreement has been totally successful. Most of the WTO member countries avoided 
committing education during the Uruguay Round (1986-1994) and, when they did, 
they introduced numerous limitations and exceptions. Something similar happened 
during the more recent Doha Round (2001- ongoing in 2008). 
The uneven evolution of the GATS raises several questions. Specifically, the 
question this article tries to answer is: why do countries decide to participate – or not 
to participate – in the new multilateral ‘free-trade in education regime’ through the 
adoption of liberalization commitments within the GATS? This question will be 
answered through an explanation based on mechanisms. In doing so, I aim to reveal 
the causal mechanisms of education liberalization within the GATS and to explore 
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how the effectiveness of these mechanisms is contingent on contextual conditions and 
national politics. 
The article is composed of four sections. First, I describe the object of my 
research as well as my framework of inquiry, which is inspired by the ‘Globally 
Structured Agenda for Education’ approach (GSAE) (Dale 2000). Second, I explore 
the structures that frame the liberalization process, referring specifically to the WTO 
rules that affect more directly negotiations in service sectors. Third, I discuss the 
preferences settlement of countries in GATS and education negotiations, focusing on 
their decisions as well as on the inter-scalar complexities of the decision-making 
procedure. Finally, I argue that the key mechanisms of education liberalization 
commitments of the countries are embedded within the dominant negotiation rationale 
within the WTO context. I also highlight the conditions that mediate between the 
activation of the mechanisms and their political outcomes. 
My argument is based on intensive fieldwork involving international actors 
who directly participate in the negotiation subsystem of the GATS (trade negotiators 
in the WTO headquarters and WTO staff). The fieldwork has been more intensive in 
relation to two countries (Argentina and Chile), where I have also interviewed 
Ministry of Trade representatives and education stakeholders representatives. Doing 
field-work at the national level was necessary to capture the multi-level nature of 
trade negotiations as well as to have a more complete picture of the politics of the 
services negotiations. The main criterion for selecting the countries was 
comparability. The two cases are ‘comparable’ because they share some features, but 
they differ in relation to the independent variable (Green 2003). In our case, the latter 
means that each country has a different behavior when negotiating education in the 
framework of the GATS (Argentina has publicly stated that is not going to commit 
education under any trade agreement, and Chile signaled its willingness to include 
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education within the Doha Round framework and, in fact, has already opened 
education to trade in numerous bilateral trade agreements). Between June 2005 and 
December 2007, I conducted a total of twenty-seven interviews of trade 
representatives and twenty-nine interviews of education representatives. The 
interviews retrieved data about the procedure of the negotiations (consultations to 
stakeholders, articulation of the negotiations between the global and national level, 
etc.), the position of the country in relation to the liberalization of education within 
the GATS as well as the rationale that grounds the position adopted.  
 
Education Sciences and the ‘Politics of Education’ Turn 
Since the 1990s, research on ‘globalization’ has been strongly present in the 
field of education sciences. But globalization is more than a new topic in the research 
agenda. Taking globalization seriously means having to review the theory and 
methodology we use, as well as the analytical instruments and the core research 
questions. One theoretical approach that seeks to face these challenges is the Globally 
Structured Agenda for Education approach (GSAE). The GSAE provides a coherent 
corpus of theoretical and conceptual elements to capture the complex and 
multidimensional relation between globalization and education. Its main ontological 
assumption is that the world capitalist economy is the driving force of globalization 
and the first causal source of multiple transformations manifested in different policy 
areas, including education. Consequently, capitalism’s expansion and transformations 
directly and indirectly affect contemporary education systems, although its effects on 
education systems are also locally mediated (Dale 2000). So, globalization is not an 
absolute project with identical effects in all places (Robertson and Dale 2006). 
Although globalization presents common features around the world, the effects of 
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globalization in education and in other fields are mediated by domestic factors and 
contingencies. 
Following this approach, one of the objectives of educational research should 
be to explain the link between the changes in the global economy and politics, and the 
changes in national educational policies and practices (Dale 2000). This implies 
recognizing that education outcomes are not always related to educational inputs and 
procedures, at least in part because education is highly influenced by extra-
educational events and processes. That is the reason why the GSAE stresses the need 
to methodologically transcend ‘educationism’ and to consider the ‘politics of 
education’ level of analysis (Dale and Robertson 2007). The politics of education 
refer to the educational agenda and the processes and structures through which this 
agenda is created (Dale, 1994). In a more globalized environment, the politics of 
education level of analysis entails understanding education problems and systems as 
embedded within a complex local, national and global political economy (Novelli and 
Lopes-Cardozo 2008). In this context, international organizations, both regional and 
global, are becoming more influential in the settlement of policy agendas that will 
frame education politics at the national and local level (Robertson and Dale 2006). 
The increasing role of a broad range of finance-driven and humanitarian international 
organizations in education means that we need to adopt an inter-sectorial approach to 
explain education. To a great extent, this is due to the fact that these organizations do 
not always treat education as a topic; they rather conceive education as a resource to 
deal with other topics (Jones 2007). So, they subordinate education to non-education 
agendas that cover, for instance, social and economic issues, such as poverty 
reduction, economic growth and, since the constitution of the WTO, international 
trade. 
Furthermore adopting a pluri-scalar conception of education phenomena 
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permits a more accurate representation of the nature of power relations, decision-
taking procedures and the outcomes of these procedures. In the global era, it is 
important to analyse the same phenomenon in more than one scale and to 
differenciate how the elements are presented and articulated in each of the relevant 
scales (Robertson et al. 2002). In one word, the scalar interaction and the scalar 
division of education governance become new variables that introduce complexity to 
education reality and, consequently, to education analysis. 
Finally, the politics of education focus implies that the (re)structuring of a 
global education agenda is not a process without subjects. International organizations, 
transnational corporations and powerful states are key actors in shaping and driving 
this process. Nevertheless, globalization can also be contested – and transformed – 
through a range of sociopolitical and discursive processes, strategies, and struggles, 
led by labor unions or local and global social movements (Robertson et al 2002). 
 
Focus on Mechanisms 
Global structures contribute, more and more, to our understanding of a broad 
range of education events and changes that emerge at the national and local levels. 
However, a more strategic and relational argumentation line would also contemplate 
that education events and changes are the consequence of causal mechanisms 
activated by actors in different scales and layers of structure. The GSAE identifies a 
set of external mechanisms that, once activated, account for the global influences in 
national education policy. Specifically, Dale (1999) categorizes a series of voluntary 
and compulsory global mechanisms, normally related to international organizations, 
which, in recent decades, have acquired more centrality than traditional mechanisms 
of external influence such as `policy borrowing’ and `policy learning’. These new 
mechanisms are: 
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• imposition is activated when external actors, such as international 
organizations or powerful states, compel some countries to take on particular 
education policies (the classic example being the conditionality to credit of the 
World Bank, the IMF and other aid agencies to borrower countries); 
• harmonization is realized when a set of countries mutually agree on the 
implementation of common policies in a certain policy area (e.g., the 
configuration of the European Space for Higher Education); 
• dissemination is activated when an international organization uses persuasion 
and its technical knowledge to convince countries on the implementation of 
certain policies (e.g., through annual reports, best practices data-bases and 
technical assistance)s; 
• standardization occurs when the international community defines and 
promotes the adhesion to a set of policy principles and standards that frame 
the countries’ behavior (e.g., international performance tests, such as the 
PISA, contribute to the standardization of curricular content at the global 
level); and 
• installing interdependence occurs when countries agree to achieve common 
objectives to tackle problems that require international cooperation (e.g., 
climate change, ‘education for all’). 
 
Definition of the Research Problem  
The emergence of an international organization, such as the WTO, that 
promotes free trade at a global level and directly alters national education regulation, 
validates the GSAE’s main claim regarding global capitalism as the primary causal 
source of important changes in the education field. The constitution of GATS itself 
represents a radical change of the rules of the game for transnational education. 
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However, as will be developed, the GATS is an incomplete agreement that must be 
progressively negotiated by countries. Having said that, my research insterest is 
centered on how countries deal with this new transnational framework of rules and 
how they contribute to the structuration process of the trade in education regime 
promoted by the agreement. I do not pretend to analyze ‘why the GATS exists’; rather 
I seek to understand why the WTO member countries liberalize education under the 
GATS and, consequently, they accept (or refuse) to incorporate GATS rules in the 
regulation of their education systems. 
Answering this causal question implies answering other questions with a more 
constitutive logic, such as: who influences and who makes the final decision to 
liberalize – or not – education in the framework of the WTO (education ministries, 
trade representatives, education stakeholders, etc.)? At which scale is this decision 
actually taken (global or local)? Which external mechanisms are being activated by 
the WTO to influence the behavior of member countries in relation to education 
liberalization? Which extra-educational factors are affecting the liberalization of 
education? 
 
Education in the GATS/WTO System of Rules 
The WTO system does not have a particular education mandate, nor does it 
push for an explicit education agenda. The WTO is basically concerned with the 
promotion of free trade of all kinds of goods and services, including education 
services, at a planetary scale. However, the barriers to trade that the WTO (via GATS) 
seeks to remove or adjust are embedded in nation states’ education regulations. They 
are, for instance, limits to foreign capital in education services, taxes on the 
repatriation of the profits of education companies, stipulations as to what type of legal 
status educational centers must adopt, quality of educational services measures, 
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subsidies to educational centers, etc. (Verger 2008a). 
The negotiations of trade in services are developed in the framework of a strict 
system of rules that pushes for certain outcomes, drives towards ‘possible and 
desirable’ results, and rules out ‘unacceptable’ results. The most important WTO rules 
for negotiating services are contained in the GATS and, specifically, in the 
“Progressive Liberalization” section of the agreement, which establishes that:  
Members shall enter into successive rounds of negotiations, beginning not 
later than five years from the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement 
and periodically thereafter, with a view to achieving a progressively higher 
level of liberalization. Such negotiations shall be directed to the reduction or 
elimination of the adverse effects on trade in services of measures as a means 
of providing effective market access. (Article XIX) 
Article XXI (also included in the progressive liberalization section) establishes 
significant impediments for countries to break off liberalization commitments. 
These articles make clear that the rules of the game contained in the GATS are 
not only about trade; they are about the promotion of a specific system of 
international trade: ‘free trade’.2 Thus, the constitutive rules and principles of the 
WTO/GATS seek the promotion of free trade at a global scale. They present this 
specific trade system as the “natural kind of capitalism” that all the countries of the 
world should embrace (Wade 2005). There are other principles that theoretically 
orient the role and content of the WTO, but none of them is so well fixed as the free-
trade principle. In fact, this principle is stronger in the WTO than in the precursor 
trade rules, the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT), adopted in 1947 
and incorporated into the WTO when it was established in 1995. The original GATT 
instituted a commercial regime of Keynesian-embedded liberalism. But the WTO, 
which was created in a period of neoliberal climax, clearly breaks the balance 
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between the global liberalization objective and the capacity of states to deliver on 
their social purposes, for instance, providing public services such as health and 
education (Ford 2002; Ruggie 1994). 
The methodology of the negotiation of services constitutes another important 
set of rules to understand the GATS outcomes. The specific methodology is not 
totally fixed in the GATS; member countries have to reach a consensus on negotiation 
procedures at the beginning of each negotiation round. In the two services rounds 
(Uruguay and Doha), the demand-offer method was adopted. First, each country 
makes demands to other countries to open those service sectors in which they are 
interested. Then, the countries respond to these demands by listing the sectors (e.g., 
education, health, tourism) and subsectors (e.g., primary, secondary, higher education, 
and adult education) they are offering for liberalization. These lists are provisional 
and can be modified successively during the negotiations. The round concludes when 
all the member countries present their last and definitive list of offers. The lists 
indicate whether the countries decide to introduce liberalization commitments, in 
which services sectors and subsectors, and at what level of intensity. It is not 
compulsory to liberalize a minimum of services sectors or subsectors at the end of the 
round, although the EU tried, unsuccessfully, to change this rule in the WTO 
ministerial conference in Hong Kong in 2005 as a way of accelerating the 
liberalization process.3 
It is important to stress that education and other services sectors are not 
negotiated independently or one by one. They are negotiated in relation to all the 
topics covered by the negotiation round. The topics covered in the Doha Round, in 
addition to services, include the following: application issues, non-agriculture market 
access, norms, intellectual property, differences settlement, textiles, agriculture, 
investment, government procurement, trade facilitation, environment, electronic 
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commerce, small economies, debt and finances, technology transfer, technical 
cooperation, less developed countries, special and differential treatment, and 
subsidies, (WTO 2005a). The method of negotiating all the topics at the same time 
and contingently is known, in trade language, as the all unique method. This implies 
that offers on one topic are conditioned to, what trade negotiators call, the “level of 
ambition” or the average level of liberalization of the different topics negotiated 
during the round. 
Another important set of rules that can also affect the services outcomes is not 
actually contained in the GATS itself, but is articulated in the WTO accession rules, 
the dispute settlement system and the trade policy exams. The WTO accession rules, 
in contrast to the rules mentioned above, only affect the new members of the 
organization. These rules force those countries that want to become WTO members to 
apply deep liberalization packages in services as well as in other sectors of their 
economy (Verger 2008b). The Dispute Settlement System is very powerful and 
effective (WTO 2004). It does not force members to establish liberalization 
commitments, but can contribute to the reinterpretation of the existing commitments 
to broaden their scope – as happened to the USA in relation to the gambling services 
case (Ortino 2006).4 Last, but not least, in relation to the Trade Policy Reviews, all 
member countries submit periodically their trade policies in all areas, including 
services. The policies are then subject to evaluation by the WTO Trade Policy Review 
Body based on criteria oriented by free and open trade, previsibility, transparency and 
guarantees for foreign providers and exporters. These tests can condition the behavior 
of those member countries aspiring to get a good mark on the review or, at least, to 
avoid being publicly denigrated (Henderson 1998). 
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The Education Liberalization: Decisions and Procedures 
Until 2008, most of the WTO members have made use of the flexibility rule in 
the services negotiations and have not committed education within the GATS. 
Specifically, only 47 out of more than 150 member countries have done so.5 In the 
Doha Round the state of the art could change because several countries are planning 
to commit education. Specifically, seven countries are offering education for the first 
time, and eight countries are widening the liberalization commitments in education 
made in previous negotiations.6 
As the analysis of the WTO rules shows, member countries are encouraged to 
establish liberalization commitments in education (and other services sectors), but 
they are not normally forced to do it. Most states have enough leeway to decide 
whether they want to open their education to trade in the GATS framework (the new 
member countries would be the exception).  So, the decision-taking procedure at the 
national level is a variable that can alter the results of the negotiations. That is why 
the politics and the actors that within and beyond “the state” drive and conduct the 
decision-making process in the framework of this organization must be considered. 
In relation to the decision-taking process, the first thing to be acknowledged is 
that only a specific faction of the state represents ‘the state’ within the WTO. 
Specifically, the WTO state representatives are linked to the Ministries of Trade, 
Economy and/or Foreign Affairs. This has important implications because how the 
decisions are framed and by whom directly affect the final result. Despite the fact that 
the WTO agreements have to be ratified by national parliaments in most countries, the 
full procedure is being coordinated by trade experts who control the data and 
knowledge on the policy issue as well as key information related to the negotiation 
process (e.g., other actors’ preferences and demands). So, trade representatives 
conduct the negotiations and, very often, aiming to achieve the positions they prefer, 
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they influence the views of the state regulators and private stakeholders that interact 
in the focal services sectors. For instance, in relation to the education sector, trade 
representatives usually emphasise the opportunities of education liberalization and 
minimize the risks (such as a quality education decrease). In fact, most of the trade 
negotiators interviewed believe in the positive effects of education liberalization 
within the GATS. To illustrate:  
There is a clear consensus on the fact that the education in my country is bad, 
and we have to find ways of improving it. This means having to bring teachers 
from abroad [...]. The GATS could increase competitiveness, and that is 
indispensable. (Trade negotiator 12, Geneva, 2006) 
 
[In education] we can receive interesting things from other countries, both in 
relation to the teaching profession, and in relation to curriculum aspects; it 
also offers the possibility to our students to receive foreign university services 
without having to leave the country. (Trade negotiator 04, Geneva, 2006) 
 Officially, however, trade ministries do not define the preferences of the 
country autonomously. In the case of the GATS negotiations, they are supposed to 
consult the stakeholders and regulators of each service sector at the national level, 
which is a tedious task because of the large number of sectorial meetings that are 
required and the wide range of demands and inputs that must be processed. The 
GATS covers twelve broad services sectors, and each sector represents a field where 
official regulators, private providers, interest groups, trade unions and quality 
assurance agencies interact. The fact that these actors normally make contradictory 
demands in the framework of the GATS negotiations makes the process much more 
complex. For instance, in relation to the education sector, the education ministry may 
be interested in opening education to trade to attract foreign investment and expertise 
 12
to the higher education system, while the association of private universities may 
oppose it to avoid having to compete with new foreign private providers. 
Thus, this consultation process is usually done by taking ‘shortcuts’, because 
the trade negotiators do not have enough time or human resources to develop a deep 
process in relation to all the sectors and actors, as noted by these negotiators from 
Chile and Argentina:7  
[Negotiating services] is just horrible. Our team is very small and we have to 
participate in a lot of meetings. So, it is not easy […] Everybody expects you to 
know everything; when I attend a meeting on computing services, I am 
supposed to understand everything and that is impossible  […] And the world of 
services is so complex that nobody understands anything, nobody… In Chile 
there are only ten people who really know what services negotiations are about. 
(Trade negotiator 17, Santiago, 2006) 
 
The problem of selecting the offers is that just a few people are working on this 
area; only one person is doing this in our country at the multilateral level. And 
very few people understand it… [C]onsultations with regulators are problematic 
(…) [because] they don’t understand GATS; their work consists of regulating, 
and they never regulate a service taking into account that it can be traded. They 
just try to achieve certain polity objectives through regulation, without taking 
into account how this could affect trade (...) It is a hard work to explain to them 
why we are asking what we are asking (…) Regulators of certain sectors just 
don’t know why their work is related to an international treaty… [I]t takes a lot 
of time… and in many occasions it is a fruitless task. (Trade negotiator 02, 
Geneva, 2006) 
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Consequently, the consultation process cannot be as complete as it is supposed to be. 
However, in addition to resource constraints, political bias and preferences also limit 
broader participation in the consultation processes. As a result, some actors are ‘more 
consulted’ than others. For example, trade negotiators normally have extensive 
interactions with the employers and national industry representatives: 
We are organizing the private services industry in our country. We want them to 
understand what it is about and help them to formulate their demands. They are 
more and more mobilized, they have learnt a lot… (Trade negotiator 18, 
Santiago, 2006) 
 
In the framework of Doha we have consulted the services industry, and our 
demand has been done on the basis of what these industries want, what they 
want to export. (Trade negotiator 05, Geneva, 2006) 
 
However, trade negotiators interact less often with trade union representatives, whom 
they view as opposing liberalization policies: 
Teachers’ Unions? Yes, they talk about GATS, but they have not discussed the 
topic very deeply; they are confused, they are afraid… [T]hey are afraid that 
education could be privatized. But in our country there has been private 
education for the last 50 years. Whatever the government does to make 
education more efficient, they think that education will be privatized… (Trade 
negotiator 07, Geneva, 2006) 
 
Unions do not understand GATS; their arguments are fallacious… The GATS 
does not degenerate education policy; education policy degenerates by itself 
(Trade negotiator 21, Madrid, 2006) 
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Another common shortcut is related to the type of consultation (strong or soft) 
that is done. First, the stakeholders can be asked whether or not they want their sector 
to be opened (or more opened) to trade under the GATS. That would be a strong type 
of consultation because the stakeholders would have the opportunity to directly define 
the country position. Alternatively, trade negotiators can engage in soft consultation 
by asking stakeholders ‘how they would adjust some technical and regulatory aspects 
if trade liberalization commitments are adopted’. In this case, the decision to open the 
sector to international trade is, in effect, already taken by the trade ministry, prior to 
consultation. Although both models occur, interviewees reported that the soft model 
(at least in relation to the education sector) is the most common. This implies that 
education ministries and other education stakeholders are not key actors when 
defining the country’s position in the negotiations. 
 
The Red Line through Education: Evidence from Country Cases 
Once the country preferences have been established at the national level, the 
trade ministry communicates the negotiation guidelines to the country trade 
representatives at the WTO. This mandate can be more or less strict.8 In the less strict 
case, the mandate is more open to the interpretation of the trade negotiator. However, 
there are sectors through which countries draw a clear red-line, so that trade 
negotiators know for sure that they cannot offer the liberalization of this sector during 
the negotiations. During the Doha round, for instance, some countries, such as 
Argentina, Brazil and Venezuela drew a red line through the education sector. As the 
respective trade representatives stated:  
We received the plurilateral demand on education coordinated by New Zealand 
[in 2006], but we received the instruction from the capital9 that we should not 
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even attend the meeting. It is a topic absolutely vetoed for us. (Trade negotiator 
01, Geneva, 2006) 
 
Education is an interesting case. Initially, we thought that we would have 
offensive interests10 (…) but the defensive parties came onto the scene and, 
because of ideology or lack of knowledge, they neglected any possibility of 
making offers [or] demands in education because they say that education should 
not be a commodity or a tradable object. It seems that the consultation process 
was very comprehensive in Buenos Aires; in fact, even a statement against the 
negotiation of education within the WTO was adopted in the framework of 
MERCOSUR.  (Trade negotiator 02, Geneva, 2006) 
 
Education is one of the most sensitive sectors, of course. In general, we have 
very open services sectors, in telecommunications, in audio-visual, etc. But 
education and health are two key issues to address the social problems that we 
want to address in our country. That is why we are not committing even a bit of 
sovereignty in these two areas. (Trade negotiator 11, Geneva, 2006) 
 
 The decision to not commit education in these countries is associated with 
domestic political conditions. The first common pattern of them is that they have 
governments with an economic-nationalist ideology and a socialist or social-democrat 
orientation. Second, the governments have been receptive to the demands of anti-
GATS education stakeholders (normally, public universities and teacher unions). And 
third, in these countries, the education ministry has intervened in the negotiations 
process, publicly stating that education cannot be committed in trade agreements.  In 
countries such as Argentina, where the Ministry of Trade was willing to commit to 
 16
education, the Ministry of Education exercised its veto power over making such 
commitments. The Ministry of Education of this country, after an anti-GATS 
campaign initiated by the biggest teacher unions in these countries, signed public 
declarations, such as La Declaración de Brasilia and La Declaración de Montevideo, 
which state that the education sector is red-lined with regard to negotiations under the 
GATS: 
The declaration [...] expresses the following commitments: on the part of the 
Ministers of Education, the conviction of not including education within the 
scope of GATS; on the part of the teachers unions, to raise awareness and 
promote mobilization to sustain the principle of education as a right, and not as a 
commodity. (Brasilia Declaration, see IE-AL, 2004) 
 
[The education ministries] reaffirm, in the framework of the WTO services 
negotiations, the position that education is a public good (...) and underline the 
importance of protecting the State authority in education regulation, which 
would be drastically limited in case our governments assume liberalization 
commitments in this sector. (Montevideo Declaration, 2005)11 
 
At times, the education ministry’s veto has generated internal conflicts within 
the State, as is evident in the Argentinean case itself. The trade representatives of this 
country, after receiving the plurilateral demand on education in 2006, consulted the 
education ministry representatives to ask if they would be willing to open ‘education’ 
to trade (notice that, in this case, a strong type of consultation was promoted). The 
education ministry representatives responded that it was absolutely impossible to do 
so because the Education Minister had indicated by signing the above-mentioned 
declarations his opposition to committing education in free trade agreements. 
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Interestingly, the Argentinean trade negotiator was very disappointed with the answer 
and warned the education representative that the Trade Minister in person would 
'solve this problem with the Education Minister at the political level' (Trade negotiator 
16, Buenos Aires, 2006). However, in the end, the position of the Ministry of 
Education prevailed. 
The complexity of the GATS negotiation procedure shows that the State is a 
field made up of different units that can have different agendas and priorities that 
overlap or conflict (Jessop, 1990). So, only certain factions of the State succeed in 
imposing their agenda and preferences in relation to international organizations. This 
would explain why, for instance, there are contradictions between the content of 
international agreements such as the GATS (negotiated by Trade Ministers) and the 
UNESCO Convention on Cultural Diversity (negotiated by Education and Culture 
Ministers), although both agreements have been signed, to a great extent, by the same 
states.12 The GATS negotiations also reflect that non-state actors are able to become 
politically relevant in the global governance scenario. In fact, the red lines drawn 
through education in some countries show that non-state actors, such as teachers 
unions, can play a key role to define the country’s position in certain trade areas. 
 
Explaining GATS and Education Outcomes  
The WTO rules and the negotiating procedures help us understand education 
trade liberalization within the GATS, but we also need to consider mediating factors 
such as interests and ideas of member countries. Both interests and ideas refer to 
human action as well as social structures and, as it will be argued, they are important 
components of the explanation of the results of the GATS negotiations. 
 
The External Mechanisms of Influence at the WTO 
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Most of the top-down mechanisms categorized by Dale (imposition, 
harmonization, standardization, dissemination, etc.) are being activated in the 
framework of the WTO. Nevertheless, none of these mechanisms by itself broadly 
explains the education liberalization subscribed by the countries within the 
WTO/GATS. 
First, as we have seen, education liberalization commitments are not generally 
imposed. The imposition mechanism is only activated in relation to the WTO new 
members and in the specific moment of their entry – see explanation above on the 
WTO access rules. In other cases, smaller economies and weaker states are exposed to 
blackmail or threats. In fact, rich countries have also the capacity to give loans or 
foreign aid as well to alleviate debt, and can use these to encourage countries to sign 
certain trade agreements (Jawara and Kwa 2004). However, these mechanisms only 
affect weaker countries and are intensified in key moments of the negotiations. In the 
majority of cases, developed and developing countries adopt liberalization 
commitments voluntarily. On the other hand, members can also use the Dispute 
Settlement Rules to impose a behavior on other countries, but it has never been 
activated in relation to the education sector. 
Second, harmonization could be considered a more frequent and powerful 
mechanism than imposition because the WTO rules encourage gradual trade 
liberalization, and member countries formally accepted this harmonization framework 
when they signed the GATS. Nevertheless, as we have seen, this process is not 
advancing smoothly because an important number of member countries are rejecting 
the establishment of liberalization commitments. Third, the standardization 
mechanism will become more central when the domestic regulation negotiations 
finish (Abugattas 2006), but as of 2008 this was not very directly linked to the 
liberalization negotiations.13 
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Finally, the dissemination mechanism is being activated within the WTO to 
promote education liberalization. The WTO staff is very active in disseminating the 
free trade principle through different instruments (trade policy reviews, publications, 
courses for trade negotiators, technical assistance and so on), but these instruments 
have a very general nature and, hardly ever focus specifically on the education sector. 
In fact, within the WTO staff, there is only one person – an international lawyer – 
dedicated to education, and the WTO Secretariat has published only two papers on 
education since it was created (see WTO 1998 and 2005b). But this is the normal 
consequence of the fact that, as mentioned, the WTO does not have an explicit 
‘education agenda’ or an ‘education mandate’. Other pro-free trade international 
organizations such as the OECD and the World Bank are also promoting the 
advantages, for both rich and developing countries, to open their education under the 
GATS (see Larsen et al. 2002; OECD 2004; OECD and World Bank 2007). Although, 
again, the messages contained in such dissemination activities are unlikely to 
determine a country’s decision regarding whether or not to open education to trade.    
 
The Negotiation Rationale 
Beyond top-down mechanisms, the key mechanism to understand the results 
of the GATS negotiations in the education field is embedded in the dominant 
negotiation rationale at the WTO. Educationists have tried to discover the ‘education 
rationale’ behind education liberalization under the GATS. For instance, several 
authors argue that some countries – such as China and Malaysia – facilitate trade in 
education services to attract expertise and knowledge from abroad. Therefore, they 
would use the GATS and other trade agreements to strengthen this capacity building 
process (Larsen et al. 2004; Zhang 2003). Knight (2002) explores the educational 
arguments in the legitimating discourse of those countries that promote education 
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liberalization under the GATS such as New Zealand, Australia and the USA. In turn, 
Mundy and Iga (2003) maintain that there is a link between education funding 
policies of countries and education liberalization within the GATS. Elsewhere, I have 
also tried to explain the same phenomenon through a constructivist approach and 
through the analysis of the official positions on education of a sample of WTO 
member countries (Verger 2008a). Nevertheless, in general, attempts to identify 
education rationales in the countries’ trade policy have been rather forced. Probably, 
this is due to the fact that researchers have taken for granted that there is a causal 
relationship between the GATS outcomes and the education necessities, worries or 
strategies of countries. Instead of assuming this relationship, the preliminary research 
question should be: is there an ‘education-oriented rationale’ in the GATS 
negotiations? 
Most trade negotiators interviewed think of education as a potentially 
profitable and tradable industry that can contribute to a nation’s wealth. So, a certain 
education rationale, although of a business-oriented nature, can be identified during 
the negotiation process. However, this rationale is more relevant in the demands stage 
of the negotiations than in the offers one. This means that “education” is not normally 
behind the decision of opening education in the GATS framework. There are some 
observable general trends that indicate this. First, I have found that certain 
characteristics of education systems (such as the size of the private sector, subsidies to 
private centers or the private funding of education) are not statistically related (at least 
in a way that can be globally extrapolated) with the results of GATS negotiations 
(Verger 2008b). Second, although higher education is the education subsector in 
which trade flows are bigger and trade liberalization pressures and demands are more 
intense, such pressures have not been reflected, until now, in a higher frequency of 
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liberalization commitments compared to other education subsectors (primary, 
secondary and adult education) (Verger 2009-forthcoming). 
Moreover, the interviews conducted with trade negotiators show that, to some 
extent, the topic of education has a very low profile in the discourse of the actors that 
are conducting the services negotiations. When asked about education issues, trade 
negotiators did not demonstrate much of an awareness of the passionate debate on 
GATS and its effects on education initiated by the international education community, 
and they never referred to education sources when discussing the topic. Negotiators 
have their own opinions on the area, which, as mentioned, normally emphasizes the 
potential positive effects of GATS for education. In fact, it seems that they apply to 
education the same meaning frames that they would apply to the analysis of any other 
service or commodity. 
Finally, the interview data also show that, an absence of a shared narrative on 
the aims and conditions that make necessary an international trade in education 
regime (for a more detailed analysis, see Verger 2008a). In brief, it is doubtful that the 
education arguments are the driving rationale of the decision of whether or not to 
liberalize education under the GATS. 
 However, a few exceptions have been identified during the Doha Round. As 
mentioned before, certain countries have adopted the official position of not 
committing education because of explicit worries over the GATS effects on 
education. In some countries these concerns have been directly expressed by the 
government (Venezuela) and in others they have been raised by influential education 
stakeholders and then adopted by the government (Argentina and Brazil).14  
However, this cautious approach to the education liberalization was more 
common during the Uruguay Round. In that round, the services area was very new 
and generated uncertainties that clearly conditioned the behavior of the countries, 
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above all developing countries. This would explain why, during the Uruguay Round, 
the great majority of developing countries did not commit sensitive sectors such as 
education. In fact, this was also the attitude of countries, such as Chile, that latter on 
become more openly liberal in relation to trade in services: 
In that moment the ignorance on services was so high that we just did what other 
countries did. If the developed countries did not commit education and health, 
we would not be so naïve to do it. Our starting point was the offers of developed 
countries and, from that point, we started to take out things ... We did it because 
of prejudice and without any fundamental reason. Also to leave negotiation 
spaces for the future [...] in that moment we were very cautious. (Trade 
negotiator 18, Santiago, 2006) 
 
In Uruguay, we were extremely conservative; the GATS was very new and we 
did the minimum possible. (Trade negotiator 17, Santiago, 2006) 
 In the Doha Round, the cautious approach became less relevant and most 
countries were willing to offer education depending on the level of ambition acquired 
by the negotiations. This is due to the fact that, in the framework of a multilateral 
negotiation, the principal objective of trade representatives is to consolidate or to open 
new markets to favor their national industry’s export activities. If to achieve this 
objective they have to make some “concessions” in certain sectors (opening them to 
trade), they would do so. However, this negotiation rationale drastically contradicts 
the free trade principle at the core of the WTO system of rules. The liberal theory of 
trade sustains that opening national markets to international competition is not only 
positive for foreign exporters; it is also positive for the importer because ‘free trade’ 
optimizes utilities and contributes to a more efficient and competitive national 
industry and consumption markets. Instead of really applying free trade theory, 
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negotiators seem to be swapping stickers to fulfill the interests of their country’s 
bigger exporters. One Argentinean negotiator explained very clearly the bargaining 
nature of the negotiators, indicating that the objective of each country is to maximize 
their particular interests: “We are not going to give presents for free. When you go to 
the market to buy potatoes, you need five pesos, but with this money you have to try 
to buy a five-kilo bag, not the one-kilo bag ... We are on it.” (Trade negotiator 15, 
Buenos Aires, 2006). 
 Stances like this contradict clearly the nature of free trade. If countries were 
free-trade believers, they would remove barriers to trade unilaterally and without 
having to expect any concession by others. In fact, they would not consider removing 
barriers to trade as ‘concessions,’ but would consider that it is the best policy to 
organize most sectors of their economy. However, this is not the dominant set of ideas 
among trade negotiators. The chief of the Chilean delegation in the WTO, who 
articulated strongly free-trade beliefs, was really disappointed with this situation: 
In the WTO context, there are a lot of things that are irrational. The basic 
premise of the system is that free trade is good, that Smith and Ricardo were 
right. (...) However, the negotiation process is inverted. First, we talk about 
liberalizing the economy as a ‘concession’, as a cost, when actually it is a 
benefit.(...) A lot of countries, above all the developing countries, do not 
understand the basic premise of free trade and the rules of the game … [In the 
negotiations] there is a deeply wrong ideology (…) The recent history 
demonstrates that the free trade premise is right, that it works ... If we organize 
an open discussion, it is clear which argument [should] win. However, it doesn’t 
happen. (Trade negotiator 12, Geneva, 2006) 
Robert Putnam (1998) has already argued that international negotiators must 
satisfy above all else “national interests” and push forward these interests in light of 
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what is available to negotiators from other countries. Paul Krugman (1997, 114) has 
also captured very clearly the contradiction between the liberalization principle and 
the actual facts at the WTO and other international trade forums: 
Anyone who has tried to make sense of international trade negotiations 
eventually realizes that they can only be understood by realizing that they are a 
game scored according to mercantilist rules, in which an increase in exports –  
no matter how expensive to produce in terms of other opportunities foregone –  
is a victory, and an increase in imports – no matter how many resources it 
releases for other uses – is a defeat. 
Following Krugman’s statement, the mercantilist ideology would be the master frame 
of the WTO negotiations. Interestingly, mercantilism was supposed to be superseded 
by the comparative advantage theory and by the free trade proposal a long time ago. 
However, at least in the education services sector, it still constitutes an informal set of 
rules that casts a shadow over the formal WTO rules and is much more influential 
than the official liberalization rules and principles. The mercantilist ideology entails 
education being treated as one more bargaining chip in the framework of the above 
mentioned “all unique” negotiation procedure that prevails at the WTO. The majority 
of countries could offer education in exchange for liberalization commitments in other 
areas where they have offensive interests (such as agriculture, cotton or textile). This 
is normally the case of developing countries, which normally do not have so much 
capacity of exporting education and are more susceptible of having defensive 
interests. As the negotiators of three developing countries admitted:15 
We always perceive services as a bargaining chip; we could make concessions if 
we get something back. That is our basic logic for negotiating services. The 
premise that “liberalization is good” doesn’t work with us. We do not believe in 
this doctrine; in fact, this discourse sets my nerves on edge. Here, nobody 
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believes it, not even their preachers [referring to the WTO staff] believe it. 
(Trade negotiator 01, Geneva, 2006) 
 
I always see the services area as an instrument of developed countries for 
opening new markets, which is totally legitimate... [However,] we are not going 
to improve our current services offer, which is actually a good offer, without 
receiving something in exchange, [and not just] receiving empty promises in 
agriculture. (Trade negotiator 15, Buenos Aires, 2006) 
 
Education? No, we don’t have any commitment at the WTO level. Neither have 
we received any demand on education. We will only commit education if we 
can receive something in exchange (…). In the end, we present an all unique list, 
we do a general balance and education is just one part. (Trade negotiator 07, 
Geneva, 2006) 
 
Analytical Remarks   
If member countries’ actions and decisions were driven by the WTO rules and 
principles, education liberalization would advance faster. If that was the case, 
negotiations regarding liberalizing trade of education services would respond to a 
linear and top-down model, as the one represented by Figure 1. In this model, 
countries appropriate and/or act in accordance with the rules and the norms that have 
been constructed and accepted by them in the framework of the WTO. So, the WTO 
system of rules, which is located at the global level, would become the principal 
factor conditioning the GATS results in the education field. The expected result 
would be countries committing to education liberalization. Once the round finishes, 
these commitments become a part of the international trade in education regime. This 
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new regime, when a new round of education begins, will act as an autonomous source 
of influence that would contribute to the harmonization of the liberalization process. 
 
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Nevertheless, the actual picture in the WTO is much more complex (see 
Figure 2). First, several mechanisms and rationales are activated at the same time and 
in contradictory ways: harmonization, the cautious approach and the strategy of using 
education as a bargaining chip. I have stressed that the latter, which is a consequence 
of the predominance of the mercantilist ideology in the WTO forum, has become the 
key rationale during the Doha Round (all indicators are that ‘caution’ was more 
relevant in the Uruguay Round). Mercantilism is not promoted at the WTO level; 
rather, it is the consequence of WTO member countries pushing for their particular 
national interests (or, more precisely, for particular national industry interests). 
 
[FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Furthermore, the powers and effects of the mercantilist ideology are mediated 
by factors and conditions, mostly located at the national level. One of these conditions 
is endogenous to the WTO system and consists in the level of ambition of the 
negotiations round. This means that, for instance, if the northern countries are not 
willing to remove export subsidies and other trade barriers to agriculture during the 
negotiations, the agriculture-exporting countries will not commit education. They will 
rather choose to protect this and other sectors to have more bargaining power in future 
negotiations. Other national-level factors include: a) the level of centralization of the 
decision-making within the ministry of trade; b) the ideology of the government of the 
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country; c) the role played by education stakeholders in the settlement process. The 
country cases analyzed show that in a context with a social-democrat and economic 
nationalistic government, with civil society campaigning against GATS and with a 
low level of centralization of the final decision in the Trade Ministry, education will 
not be committed. In such cases these three factors clearly favor the rejection of 
education commitments within the GATS and obstruct the activation or the 
effectiveness of the bargaining chip mechanism. 
 
Conclusions 
The decision-taking processes within the WTO are framed by various 
endogenous and exogenous factors. In this article, the elements that affect education 
liberalization decisions have been ordered in a pluri-scalar analytical model. The final 
model (see Figure 2) distinguishes the structures from the events, and emphasizes the 
explanatory power of intermediate elements. These elements refer to interests, ideas 
and mechanisms activated by human agency within the politics of the services 
negotiations. 
Since the 1990s, the WTO has joined the group of trade and finance-driven 
international organizations with ‘education’ in its framework. The fact that education 
regulation is being altered by the decisions that are taken in an international trade 
forum is a clear example of how economic globalization affects transformations in 
current education systems. Indeed, the WTO system of rules, far from being neutral, 
tries to drive member countries to apply free trade policies in education and all other 
service and commodity sectors. The WTO rules are powerful, but not absolute and 
their effects on national education policies are not always direct. In fact, in the current 
round, the Doha Round, the WTO rules are clearly mediated by the mercantilist 
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ideology that predominates in the negotiation process. After penetrating the black-box 
of the negotiations, it can be observed that member countries are basically pushing to 
maximize the interests of their national export industry. Consequently, most countries 
will liberalize education if doing so permits them to achieve their general trade 
objectives within the negotiation process. This bargaining chip mechanism is another 
clear sign that extra-education factors and rationales can affect the content of national 
educational policies and regulations. It also shows that, although the “demands of 
global Capital” help explain the existence of GATS, the specific demands of nation-
based capitalist factions explain better whether or not countries decide to apply the 
GATS disciplines to the education sector.   
 Nevertheless, the WTO services negotiations do not only reflect the conflicting 
interests of the member countries and their export industries. On occasion, the 
negotiation procedure, which requires new pluri-scalar patterns of political 
coordination, generates tensions and conflict of interests within the State itself. This 
reinforces the idea that the State, rather than being a ‘rational subject’ or a ‘static 
unit’, is a field of struggle with internal contradictions. The state faction that is present 
at the WTO, although representing the State as a whole, is directly linked to the 
county’s Ministry of Trade. Consequently, the country preferences are framed from a 
particular world view, as well as from specific prerrogatives and rationales. Other 
factions of the State, in our case the Education Ministries, do not necessarily agree 
with the views and preferences of the trade representatives, who normally have the 
main control over the negotiations. As Cox (1995) suggests, one of the consequences 
of the internationalization of the State in relation to international organizations is that 
the activity of the localized ministries (i.e., those state sections that do not participate 
directly in the international fora – e.g., the Education Ministry) remains subordinated 
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to supra-national agreements that are controled by the internationalized state faction – 
in our case, the Ministry of Trade or equivalent. However, in the GATS and education 
case this rule is contingent on the level of participation and empowerment of the 
Education Ministry and other education stakeholders. 
In fact, the interview findings also illustrate the role of non-state actors and the 
reallocation of power within global politics. Indeed, the cases analyzed suggest that 
the global and the local scales are not necessarily related in a deterministic way (i.e. 
only the global affecting the local). Without a doubt, ‘the global’, represented by the 
WTO system, imposes certain decisions on certain countries and activates the 
harmonization of trade and non-trade policies; the preferences shaping and the agenda 
negotiating settlement are also normally developed at the global level. Nevertheless, 
the locus of decision-making mainly remains at the national level, where local actors 
are particularly active and strategic in pushing for their particular interests. As a 
consequence, domestic interests and actors successfully challenge the WTO’s external 
influences. This is particularly the case of local education stakeholders that, under 
certain favorable conditions, have been able to influence the outcomes of the GATS 
negotiations. So, despite the fact that teachers unions and university associations do 
not have formal decision-making powers in the context of international trade 
negotiations, in some countries, to date, they have successfully blocked the 





 Thanks are due to Mar Griera, Mario Novelli, Xavier Rambla and Susan L. 
Robertson for their comments on a previous version of this article. My gratitude is 
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suggestions. 
2
 Free trade is an international trade system that promotes or allows the unrestricted flow of 
goods and services between countries. This liberal conception of trade is grounded in the 
principle of “comparative advantage”, which says that “countries prosper first by taking 
advantage of their assets in order to concentrate on what they can produce best, and then by 
trading these products for products that other countries produce best…” (WTO, 2005a, 13). 
The WTO is clearly framed by this theory, expressing that “liberal trade policies (…) sharpen 
competition, motivate innovation and breed success. They multiply the rewards that result 
from producing the best products, with the best design, at the best price…” (WTO, 2005a, 
13). 
3
 Specifically, the EU pushed for the introduction of numerical benchmarks to obligate 
member countries to adopt liberalization commitments in a minimum number of sub-sectors 
each round (Khor 2006). Eventually, members only agreed on reinforcing the plurilateral 
approach, which permits to a group of countries with common interests in a specific sector to 
making joint demands (Knight 2006). 
4 The USA federal and state law restricted the economic activity of “casinos on-line”. Antigua 
and Barbados considered that the USA was breaking their liberalization commitments and 
asked the WTO Dispute Settlement Body to create a panel. To defend itself, the USA first 
argued that it did not liberalize this sort of services. However, the Panel interpreted that the 
USA GATS Schedule includes specific commitments for gambling and betting services, 
which fit within the sub-sector entitled “Other Recreational Services (except sporting).” See 
the DISPUTE DS285 “USA — Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling 
and Betting Services” in http://www.wto.int/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds285_e.htm  
5
 This is not a common pattern for all services sectors. For instance, tourist services have been 
liberalized by 129 members and financial services by 109. In these figures, we include the EU 
as a single member – that is, EU member countries are not counted separately.  
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6
 Source: WTO on-line documents data base (http://www.wto.org/wto/ddf/ep/search.html). 
7
 On occasion, the ‘understanding’ problems affect the negotiators themselves. As a 
negotiator admitted: “In relation to goods, negotiators perfectly know what they are 
exchanging, where are the problems, which are the barriers of trade in apples, TVs, cars, etc. 
Everything is very clear. However, when negotiating services, we do it with a bandage on our 
eyes… There is still a lot of lack of knowledge…” (Trade negotiator 18, Santiago, 2006) 
8
 The Less Developed Countries (LDCs) represent an exception to this pluri-scalar negotiation 
procedure. This is due to the fact that LDCs concentrate their few skilled human resources in 
the WTO headquarters. These negotiators do not receive clear and strong national mandates 
and the connections and level of coordination with the national trade ministry is usually low. 
As a consequence, the LDC negotiators have more autonomy to define the preferences and 
destiny of their country within the WTO negotiations than other countries’ negotiators. This 
observation was also observed in the GATT case (Curzon and Curzon 1972). 
9
 The ‘capital’ is a metaphor commonly used by the negotiators to refer to the Ministry of 
Trade (or equivalent) of a country. 
10 In the trade negotiators’ jargon, having “offensive interests” in a topic/sector means that a 
country is pushing proactively for the trade liberalization of this topic/sector at the 
international level. 
11
 MERCOSUR/XXIX RME/ACTA N° 2/05. November 2005. Source: www.sic.inep.gov.br 
12
 The UNESCO Convention on Cultural Diversity establishes that cultural international 
exchange cannot be regulated only by the market because this would mean a loss of cultural 
richness. The convention allows member states to promote policies to protect cultural 
diversity, although this contradict free trade rules (see UNESCO 2005). 
13
 The Domestic Regulation working group has been settled within the WTO Council on 
Trade in Services and promotes parallel negotiations to the liberalization negotiations. In the 
framework of this working group, member countries are trying to reach a consensus on how 
to complete article VI of GATS, on domestic regulation. To do that, they have to define 
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which type of national policies can be considered 'more burdensome than necessary' in 
keeping countries from reaching their national objectives. The negotiations are centered in 
regulatory aspects such as qualification requirements, licensing requirements and technical 
standards. 
14
 Interestingly, trade negotiators of Argentina and Brazil do not personally share the official 
‘defensive’ position adopted by their countries concerning education. They consider it 
exaggerated and based on political reasons rather than ‘real’ concerns (Trade Negotiators 01, 
02, 15, Geneva / Buenos Aires, 2006). 
15
 Two of these quotations belong to negotiators of the two countries that signed the ‘Brasilia 
Declaration’, which shows that, as mentioned in the previous note, the official position of a 
country is not necessarily shared by its representatives. 
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